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Coleman: Unwanted Advances: Civil Commitment and Congress's Illicit Use of
UNWANTED ADVANCES: CIVIL COMMITMENT AND CONGRESS'S ILLICIT USE
OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE-UNITED STATES V. COMSTOCK

I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Comstock, 1 a unanimous panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down a federal statute allowing for the
indefinite civil commitment of "sexually dangerous" persons who have
completed serving their prison sentences. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 4248 "cannot be sustained as an exercise
of Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause or any other provision of
3
the Constitution."
Comstock is noteworthy for a number of reasons and, not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the case.4 As noted in the
opinion, the Fourth Circuit was "the first appellate court to address this question,
but the issue has divided trial courts across the nation." 5 Further, the Eighth
Circuit subsequently decided a case in which they upheld the statute, 6 thus
creating a circuit split among the courts of appeals. Additionally, the opinion
implicates significant constitutional issues of federalism and the scope of
congressional power. Finally, this case presents an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to clarify its evolving and often disputed recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.7

1.
551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009).
2.
Id. at 276 (citing Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 § 302, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4248 (2006)).
3.
Id. at 284.
4. See 129 S.Ct. 2828 (2009).
5.
Id. at 276. Compare United States v. Volungus, 599 F. Supp. 2d 68, 79 (D. Mass. 2009)
("Congress lacked power to adopt the Act's regime for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous
persons either under the Commerce Clause directly or as its authority over interstate commerce is
supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause."), and United States v. Tom, 558 F. Supp. 2d
931, 941 (D. Minn. 2008) ("[T]he Court has determined that § 4248 was not a valid exercise of
Congressional power .... ), and United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 559 (E.D.N.C.
2007) ("Because the civil commitment scheme set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 4248 is not sufficiently tied
to the exercise of any enumerated or otherwise identifiable constitutional power of Congress and
because § 4248, as currently structured, is not a proper exercise of any power that Congress might
constitutionally exercise, this court concludes that 18 U.S.C. § 4248 is unconstitutional."), with
United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (D. Haw. 2008) ("Congress acted within its
authority in enacting Title 18 U.S.C. § 4248 .... "), and United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d
317, 323 (D. Mass. 2007) ("[T]he Act was a necessary and proper exercise of congressional
power .... ), and United States v. Carta, 503 F. Supp. 2d 405, 407-08 (D. Mass. 2007) ("[T]his
court concludes that the scope of the [Necessary and Proper Clause] ... extends so far as to allow
Congress to prevent the release of those lawfully in custody, where it has rationally set up a process
for determining that those individuals are likely to commit further acts of sexual violence proscribed
under Congress's Commerce Clause authority.").
6.
United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009); see generally infra Part JV.D
(summarizing Tom).
7.
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15-16 (2005) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 552-58 (1995); id. at 568-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 604-07 (Souter, J., dissenting))
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Part II of this Note outlines the statutory, factual, and procedural background
of Comstock. Part III examines the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Comstock.
Finally, Part IV briefly explores some of the counterarguments to and potential
flaws in Comstock's reasoning, ultimately concluding the Fourth Circuit's
analysis is correct, and the Supreme Court should affirm.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

18 U.S.C. § 4248.

Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006
to "protect children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child
abuse and child pornography, to promote Internet safety, and to honor the
memory of Adam Walsh and other child crime victims. ' 8 The Act is designed as
"a comprehensive bill to address the growing epidemic of sexual violence
against children" and aims "to address loopholes and deficiencies in existing
[federal] laws" intended to protect children. 9 Described as "the most
comprehensive child crimes and protection bill in our Nation's history," 10 the
Act, among other things, "creates a National Sex Offender Registry, increases
punishments for a variety of federal crimes against children, and strengthens
existing child pornography prohibitions." 11 In addition to strengthening existing
federal law, the Act "is designed to close the gap between
federal and state
' 12
efforts to identify, track, and confine sexual predators."
The respondent's in Comstock challenged only one section of the Act. The
contested provision allows the federal government to civilly commit at the
conclusion of his sentence any federal prisoner certified as "sexually
dangerous". 13 A sexually dangerous person is one "who has engaged or
attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and who is
sexually dangerous to others." 14 The Attorney General commences a
commitment proceeding by filing a certification with a district court stating that
the prisoner is sexually dangerous. 15 This certification stays the prisoner's often

("[O]ur understanding of the reach of the Commerce Clause, as well as Congress' assertion of
authority thereunder, has evolved over time."); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence
with a standard more consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress
appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce."); see also infra Part
IV.A (analyzing Lopez, Morrison,and Raich).
8.
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587, 587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 21, and 42 U.S.C.).
9.
H.R. REP. No. 109-218, pt. 1, at 20 (2005).
10. 152 CONG. REc. S7949, S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Senator Hatch).
11. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
12. United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 (E.D.N.C. 2007).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006).
14. Id. § 4247(a)(5).
15. Id. § 4248(a).
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imminent release pending a hearing by the district court. 16 At that hearing, if the
government shows by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner is sexually
dangerous, then the court must commit the prisoner to the custody of the
Attorney General. 17 Section 4248 provides in pertinent part:
(a) INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS.-In relation to a person who is in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons... the Attorney General or any
individual authorized by the Attorney General or the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons may certify that the person is a sexually dangerous
person, and transmit the certificate to the clerk of the court for the
district in which the person is confined. The clerk shall send a copy of
the certificate to the person, and to the attorney for the
Government .... The court shall order a hearing to determine whether
the person is a sexually dangerous person. A certificate filed under this
subsection shall stay the release of the person pending completion of
procedures contained in this section.
(d) DETERMINATION AND DISPOSITION.-If, after the hearing, the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually
dangerous person, the court shall commit the person to the custody of
the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall release the person to
the appropriate official of the State in which the person is domiciled or
was tried if such State will assume responsibility for his custody, care,
and treatment. The Attorney General shall make all reasonable efforts to
cause such a State to assume such responsibility. If, notwithstanding
such efforts, neither such State will assume such responsibility, the
Attorney General shall place the person for treatment in a suitable
facility, until(1) such a State will assume such responsibility; or
(2) the person's condition is such that he is no longer sexually
dangerous to others, or will not be sexually dangerous to others if
released under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or
psychological care or treatment;
whichever is earlier. 18
A person civilly committed pursuant to § 4248 remains confined until he is
no longer sexually dangerous to others. 19 This determination, made by "the
[d]irector of the facility in which [the] person is placed," commences the
discharge procedure.20 The facility director must then file a certificate with the

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
§ 4248(d).
§ 4248(a),(d).
§ 4248(e).
See id.
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court that ordered the commitment. 21 That court must either summarily discharge
the person or, on motion of the government or sua sponte, must hold a hearing to
determine if the person should be released.22 At the hearing, if the court finds by
a preponderance of the evidence that the person is no longer sexually dangerous,
then the court shall order either his immediate discharge or a discharge
conditioned on a prescribed regimen of treatment or care.23
B. FactualBackground
Comstock consolidated five challenges to § 4248, brought by inmates
confined in the Federal Correctional Institution at Butner, North Carolina. 24 Of
the five inmates, the government had charged• three
25in with receipt of f child
pornography and two with sexual abuse of a minor. Four of the inmates found
their way• 26
into federal
custody via guilty pleas; one was found incompetent27 to
...
stand trial. Their sentences ranged from thirty-seven to ninety-six months. In
each case, the government certified the inmate as "sexually dangerous" under
§ 4248 within a month of the end of the inmate's prison term-in one case
certifying an inmate on the final day of his 96-month sentence. 28 At the time the
Fourth Circuit decided Comstock, each inmate had remained in federal custody
more than two years after the conclusion of his prison sentence.29
C. DistrictCourt Opinion
Upon being certified as sexually dangerous, all five inmates filed motions in
the Eastern District of North Carolina to dismiss the civil commitment
proceedings. 30 Although the district court did not consolidate the motions, in
31
light of their nearly identical substance, it addressed them in a single opinion.
On September 7, 2007, the district court granted the motions to dismiss, holding

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2009).
25. See United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 & n.2 (E.D.N.C. 2007).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 277-78.
29. Id. at 278. As of early 2009, more than sixty inmates remained incarcerated in the Eastern
District of North Carolina alone, all but one of whom had served all, or nearly all, of their prison
sentences when certified for further confinement. Id. at 277 n.3.
30. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
31. !d.at527n.3.
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that § 4248 was unconstitutional.32 The court found the statute exceeded
Congress's authority and violated the due process rights of those committed.33
At the outset, the district court determined that § 4248 is properly classified
as a civil, not criminal, scheme, and thus the inmates' double jeopardy, ex post
34
facto, cruel and unusual punishment, and jury trial claims were not cognizable.
The court then turned to an inspection of Congress's authority to civilly commit
sexually dangerous persons, examining "carefully the enumerated and incidental
powers upon which the government relies," 35 particularly the Necessary and
Proper Clause.36 Because that clause does not itself create any congressional
power, 37 the court sought to determine "whether § 4248 is a necessary and
proper means of effectuating" an identifiable enumerated constitutional power.38
Of the various powers suggested by the government as possible bases for
§ 4248, the39 court found the Commerce Clause to be the only plausible
possibility. Analyzint the Commerce Clause question under the precedents of
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, the court noted the lack
of any nexus between § 4248 and interstate commerce or the channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 42 Ultimately, the court concluded "that
neither the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, nor any other
authority suggested, provide Congress with the power to enact § 4248 .. .
Further, the court concluded that even if Congress had the power to enact
§ 4248, the statute was neither necessary nor proper, and it impermissibly
intruded into an area of state concern.44
Finally, the district court determined that § 4248 violated the due process
rights of the persons committed under its procedures.45 Section 4248(d) provides

32. Id. at 526.
33. Id. While the court characterized its holding as one concerning substantive due process,
id. at 526, the issue-the appropriate standard of proof for a factual determination-seems better
denominated as a violation of procedural due process.
34. Id. at 530.
35. Id.at531.
36. See U.S. CONST. art.
I,§ 8,cl.18 (providing Congress with the power "[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States").
37. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960) ("The
[Necessary and Proper Clause] is not itself a grant of power, but a caveat that the Congress
possesses all the means necessary to carry out the specifically granted 'foregoing' powers .....
38. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
39. Id. ("The other powers cited by the government-such as the power to criminalize and
punish certain conduct, and the power to prosecute-are certainly recognized government powers;
however, those powers are themselves necessary and proper exercises of power premised upon
enumerated powers.").
40. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
41. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
42. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
43. Id. at 540.
44. Id. at551.
45. Id. at 559.
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that, after a hearing to determine sexual dangerousness, a district court shall
commit the person to the Attorney General's custody if "the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually dangerous person.
This
"intermediate standard of proof' 4 differs from the standard typically applied in
criminal contexts: proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 48 Despite the fact that
§ 4248 is a civil, not criminal, scheme, "civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection."4 9 The court determined that using the clear and convincing evidence
standard rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt constituted a due
process violation. 50 In light of the conclusion that § 4248 was beyond Congress's
power and violated due process, the court declined to "address the remaining
substantive due
process and equal protection arguments also raised by
51
respondents."
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION

On appeal, a unanimous Fourth Circuit panel affirmed the holding of the
district court, finding "that § 4248 does indeed lie beyond the scope of
Congress's authority."5 2 The court anchored its decision solely in the lack of
congressional authority and declined to reach the merits of the statute's other
alleged defects. 53 While the court's holding rests primarily on Commerce Clause
analysis, federalism concerns permeate the analysis: the court was specifically
concerned about federal intrusion into an area traditionally controlled by states
despite the absence of a federal police power or parenspatriae power.54

46. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
47. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (quoting Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 370 (1970)).
49. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 426) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 552.
51. Id.at560.
52. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 2009).
53. Id. at 276 n.1. These alleged defects remain, however, as potential alternate grounds for
affirmance by the Supreme Court. See also Brief for Appellee at 18 n.3, United States v. Comstock,
551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-7671), 2008 WL 839580 (preserving issues of "the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial").
54. See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 278 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995))
("Unlike the states, the federal government has no general police or parens patriae power."); see
also id. at 283 ("[T]he Government's argument attempts to 'pile inference upon inference' so as to
'convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States."' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567)); id. at 284 ('qf the federal government
has serious concerns ... it can notify state authorities, who may use their well-settled police and
parens patriaepowers to pursue civil commitment under state law.").
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In support of the statute, the government relied almost exclusively on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 a strategy that seemed both to perplex and
exasperate the court. 56 However, because "that provision, by itself, creates no
constitutional power," 57 the court turned first to the Commerce Clause-the only
specific enumerated constitutional power the government could identify as
authorizing § 4248.58
A.

Commerce ClauseAnalysis

The Fourth Circuit's analysis relied heavily on Lopez and Morrison, cases
which "provide[] substantial assistance in resolving the question of whether the
Commerce Clause authorizes § 4248.
In those cases, the Supreme Court
identified three areas subject to Congressional regulation pursuant to the
Commerce Clause: "(1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2)
instrumentalities of or persons and things in interstate commerce, and (3)
activities that 'substantially affect' interstate commerce. ' 6° The Fourth Circuit
determined that neither of the first two categories applied; thus, the court could
uphold § 4248
"only if it regulates activities that 'substantially affect' interstate
61
commerce."
Analogizing to several "striking similarities" in Morrison, the court had no
difficulty concluding that § 4248 lay outside the scope of Congress's power.62
63
First, the statute is "aimed at the prevention of noneconomic sexual violence,,
an area that "has always been the province of the States." 64 Second, § 4248
' 65
targets conduct that is "not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.
Similar to the gender-motivated violence at issue in Morrison, "sexual
dangerousness does not substantially affect interstate commerce. ' 66 While the
statute's intent may be "a sound proposal
as a matter of social policy," 67 that
' 68
authority.
does not "create congressional

55.

Id. at 278 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) ("[T]he Government attempts to defend

the validity of § 4248 largely by direct reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause.").
56. Id.at 280 ("What is less understandable is the Government's heavy reliance on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, standing alone, as a source of congressional power.").
57. Id. at 278.
58. Id. at 279 n.5.
59. Id. at 279. For summaries of Lopez and Morrison and a discussion of whether the
Supreme Court's opinion in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), diverged from Lopez and
Morrison, see infra Part V.A.
60. Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
61. Id. (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.at 280 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id.(quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.(citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627).
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B. Necessary and ProperClause Analysis
The Fourth Circuit next turned to an analysis of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. The discussion begins by repeating that this clause "simply does not-in
and of itself-create any Congressional power. ' 69 Noting that "[o]rdinarily, this
would end [the] discussion," the court nonetheless proceeded to consider
70 the
government's arguments, which rested "almost exclusively on that Clause."
The court first considered the government's argument that § 4248 is a
necessary and proper extension of "its ability to establish and maintain a 'federal
criminal justice and penal system."' 71 The court rejected this argument, noting
the distinction between federal power over "persons during their prison
sentences" and "after the expiration of their prison terms."72 In language
mirroring the district court's conclusion, the court found that "previously lawful
federal custody simply does not, in itself, provide Congress with73 any authority to
regulate future conduct that occurs outside of the prison walls."
The Fourth Circuit then considered the government's argument that "§ 4248
constitutes a necessary and proper exercise of its power to prevent 'sex-related
crimes. '' 74 The court rejected this argument, stating that "federal statutes
regulating sex crimes are limited in number and breadth" and require a
"connection to interstate commerce or limit[] their scope to the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. 75 Furthermore, because "many commitments
under § 4248 would prevent conduct prohibited only by state law," the statute
"sweeps far too broadly to be a valid effort to prevent federal criminal
activity. ,,76 The court distinguished United States v. Perry,77 on which the
government relied, noting that the Perry court recognized "that a specific,
enumerated federal power must support a federal civil commitment. ''78 In the
absence of specific constitutional authorization, the government's argument
merely "attempts to 'pile inference upon inference' so as to 'convert
congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of
79
the sort retained by the States.'
Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered the government's argument that
§ 4248 is a necessary and proper outgrowth of the "'power to prosecute' all
persons in its custody charged with criminal offenses."80 The court rejected this

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. (citing Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960)).
Id. at281.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 282.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986).
Comstock, 551 F.3d at 282.
Id. at 283 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)).
Id.
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argument, stating "the Government has already charged, tried, and convicted [the
81
inmates] of all alleged federal crimes; it retains no power to prosecute them."
The court distinguished Greenwood v. United States,82 which upheld a statute
that, while somewhat similar to § 4248, applied only to persons found
incompetent to stand trial. 83 Accordingly, the court found Greenwood did not
approve federal civil commitment of people who, like the respondents in this
case, "have84 stood trial, been convicted, and fully served all federal prison
sentences."
C. Conclusion and Holding
The Fourth Circuit concluded "that the district court correctly held § 4248
unconstitutional. ' ,85 The court did, however, suggest alternative methods to
address "the Government's legitimate policy concerns. ' 86 Reemphasizing its
federalism concerns, the court suggested "notify[ing] state authorities, who may
use their well-settled police and parens patriae powers to pursue civil
,88
commitment under state law. ' 87 If additional incentive is needed,
the gvrmn
government
may "wield its spending power to encourage state action." Ultimately, the court
concluded its opinion by holding that § 4248 "cannot be sustained as an exercise
of Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause or any other provision of
' 89
the Constitution. "
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS TO AND POTENTIAL FLAWS IN COMSTOCK

The issue and analysis in Comstock revolve around an evolving and often
contested area of law, namely the scope of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. While an exhaustive analysis of the scope and evolution of
the Commerce Clause power is clearly beyond the scope of this Note, a few
points require a brief discussion.
Indeed, Comstock may be most notable (and objectionable) for what is
absent. While the Comstock court relied heavily on Lopez and Morrison, it
relegated the Supreme Court's most recent Commerce Clause decisionGonzales v. Raich9°--to a single footnote. 91 The court justified this because

81.
82.
83.
84.
supra text
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
350 U.S. 366 (1956).
Comstock, 551 F.3d at 283-84 (citing Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 367-68).
Id. at 284. Technically, none of the respondents were convicted after standing trial. See
accompanying note 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 280 n.6.
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"nothing in Gonzales v. Raich alters the core holding in Morrison."92 Some
scholars have contended, however, that Raich signals a pullback from the
jurisprudential deviations in Morrison and Lopez. This tension raises three
questions: (1) does Raich diverge from Morrison and Lopez?; (2) if so, which
line of reasoning controls in Comstock?; and (3) if Raich controls, does it
mandate a different result than the Fourth Circuit Court reached? For the reasons
set forth below, it appears that regardless of how the first two questions are
answered, there should be no change to the outcome and the Supreme Court will
likely affirm the Fourth Circuit.
A.

Lopez, Morrison, and Raich-Contradictionor Elaboration?

Scholarly opinion is divided as to whether Raich contradicts or merely
elaborates on the framework set95out in Lopez and Morrison.94 A brief summary
of each case may prove helpful.
1.

Lopez v. United States

Lopez involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) of
1990,9 which prohibited possession of a gun in a school zone.97 The Supreme
Court struck down the act as exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. 98 As the Comstock court noted, Lopez limited that clause's reach to (1)
the channels of interstate commerce, (2) instrumentalities of or persons and
things in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that "substantially affect"
interstate commerce. 99 Like the Fourth Circuit concluded regarding the statute at
issue in Comstock, the Lopez Court concluded that the only possibility of
sustaining the GFSZA was under the third category. 100 However, the Court
struck down that statute, finding it was "not an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity" nor was there a "jurisdictional element which

92. Id. (citation omitted).
93. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law)
Overdose, 9 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 751, 751 (2005) (arguing that Raich is a repudiation of the
doctrines adopted in Lopez and Morrison).
94. Compare id. at 777 ('qnsofar as Morrison validated and fortified the holding of United
States v. Lopez, its work has been undone."), with Christopher DiPompeo, Comment, Federal Hate
Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element
Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 637 (2008) ("Lopez, Morrison, and Raich each add to, and build
upon, the Supreme Court's new Commerce Clause doctrine ....).
95. For a more thorough discussion of these cases, see generally Adler, supra note 93.
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1988), invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 551 (1995).
97. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558-59).
100. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
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would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce." 10 1 Indeed, the Court found that possession
of a gun "is in no sense an economic activity." 10 2 Congress's power, while broad,
is not without limits, 10 3 and the Court declined to convert Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power.104
2.

Morrison v. United States

10 5
The Court expanded on this reasoning in United States v. Morrison.10 6
Morrison involved a challenge to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
that created a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. 107
Unlike Lopez, where "the link between gun possession and a substantial effect
on interstate commerce was attenuated," 10 8 in enacting the VAWA Congress
made "numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated
violence has on victims and their families."' 109 However, the "existence of
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality
of Commerce Clause legislation." 110 The Court specifically rejected the
argument that Congress can regulate based on the "aggregate effect on interstate
commerce,"
an argument that would permit Congress to regulate nearly any
crime with an "attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. 2 Ultimately, the
Court concluded that the statute was beyond Congress's power.113

3.

Gonzales v. Raich

The final member of the recent Commerce Clause trilogy is Gonzales v.
Raich,114 a challenge to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). 115 Federal Drug
Enforcement Agency agents charged Raich, who under California law was
116
legally growing and using marijuana for medicinal purposes, under the CSA.
The issue was whether the CSA, "as applied to the intrastate manufacture and
possession of marijuana for medical purposes... exceeds Congress' [s] authority
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Id. at 561.
Id. at 567.
See id. at 566.
Id. at 567.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02.
Id. at 612 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67).
See id. at 614 (noting the presence of congressional findings).
Id.
Id.at 617.
Id.at 615.
Id.at 627.
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2006).
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 6-8.
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under the Commerce Clause."11 7 Relying on "[w]ell-settled law," the Court
found the statute to be11 9"a valid exercise of federal power. '' 18 Emphasizing the
of the aggregation principle of Wickard v. Filburn,120
"particular relevance"
the Court found that "Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not
itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure
to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate
market in that commodity." 121 In fact, the Court concluded the regulation was
"squarely within Congress' [s] commerce power because the production of the
commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a
substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that
commodity." 122 The Court distinguished Lopez and Morrison,noting that, unlike
in those cases, "the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially
economic." 123 Ultimately, the Court had no difficulty concluding that Congress
had a rational basis in deciding that activities like Raich's, in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce.124
4.

Contradictionor Elaboration?

With this background in mind, we can return to the question posed earlierdoes Raich alter or merely elaborate upon the principles set out in Lopez and
Morrison? Though scholars may quibble, only the Court's precedent is binding,
and Raich itself indicates that it does not contradict or limit the earlier two
cases. 125 Indeed, Raich takes pains to distinguish those cases 126a task that is
not particularly difficult. A key distinction is that the target of the statute in
Raich-marijuana-is a commodity; 127 in contrast, statutes in Lopez and
Morrison focused on acts: gun possession and gender-motivated violence. Thus,
it appears that Raich applies to different situations than Lopez and Morrison.
Accordingly, Raich seems best labeled as an elaboration on, not a contradiction
to, principles adopted in those cases.

117. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
118. Id.at9.
119. Id.at 17.
120. See 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
121. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
122. Id.at 19.
123. Id.at 25.
124. Id.at 22.
125. See id.at23-33. Admittedly, a minority of the Justices, dissenting in Raich, see that case
as contradicting Lopez and Morrison.See id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126. See id.at 23, 26 (majority opinion); id.at 38, 40, 41 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. See id.at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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128

B. If Two Roads Diverged

Assuming for the sake of argument that Raich does diverge from and alter
the doctrines espoused in Lopez and Morrison, it remains to be determined
which of these two lines of precedent controls in Comstock. For a variety of
reasons, the Fourth Circuit was correct to rely on the reasoning of Lopez and
Morrison.
First, the Comstock court noted, "§ 4248 bears striking similarities to the
VAWA provision struck down in Morrison.' 129 Both provide a civil remedy
aimed at the prevention of sexual violence. 13 Further, both statutes target acts
that do "not substantially affect interstate commerce" and, in fact, are "not, in
any sense of the phrase, economic activity." 131 Additionally, the Raich Court
distinguished Lopez and Morrison on grounds that support the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in Comstock. Indeed, the Supreme Court found those two cases to be
"markedly different" from Raich because both "asserted that a particular statute
or provision fell outside Congress' [s] commerce power in its entirety."' 132 In
contrast, Raich involved an individual exception to "a concededly valid statutory
scheme. ' 133 In Comstock, the inmates committed under § 4248 raised a challenge
to the statute in its entirety, not simply as applied to them. 134 This more closely
mirrors the situations in Lopez and Morrison and indicates that those cases
should control.
Furthermore, the Raich Court noted that the CSA, unlike the statutes at issue
in Lopez and Morrison, dealt with activities that "are quintessentially
economic."' 135 Under this distinction, Comstock more closely resembles Lopez
and Morrison and appears quite different from Raich' s focus on "the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities."' 136 Finally, the dissenters13 in
Raich-who do see that case as a departure from Lopez and Morrison 7
clearly believe (as evidenced by their status as dissenters) that the two earlier
cases should control and would likely affirm the application of those cases to
Comstock.

128. See ROBERT FROST, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: A SELECTION OF ROBERT FROST'S POEMS

270 (Macmillen, 2002).
129. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2009).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 280 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
132. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 23.
133. Id.
134. United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 528 (E.D.N.C. 2007).
135. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) ("[The majority decision is]
irreconcilable with our decision in Lopez and Morrison.").
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Thus, even if Raich did contradict or retreat from principles set out in Lopez
and Morrison-which seems unlikely-Comstock rightly applied the line of
precedent set out in the two earlier cases.
C. PotentialResult Under Raich
While it seems unlikely, it is possible that Raich should have controlled the
determination in Comstock. If so, while a closer call, the outcome seems likely to
have remained unchanged. Raich arguably affected the Commerce Clause in
three ways, 138 two of which seem relatively benign in this instance and one of
which could affect the outcome.
' 139
First, Raich adopted a "definition of 'economic' that is almost limitless."
However, this definition, while broad, is still linked to commodities, and thus
seems unlikely to apply to § 4248.14° Second, Raich allows Congress "to impose
controls on even 'noneconomic'
activity by claiming that it is part of a broader
'regulatory scheme.' 141 However, as the Comstock court noted, "§4248
constitutes no part of a 'comprehensive' legislative scheme that targets interstate
markets."' 142 Whether there is a comprehensive legislative scheme regulating
sexually dangerous persons seems doubtful; even more dubious is whether such
a scheme truly targets interstate markets.
The third and potentially most problematic effect for Comstock is that
"Raich reasserts the so-called 'rational basis' test.' 143 Under this test,
"congressional regulation will likely.., be upheld if Congress could 'rationally'
conclude that such an [interstate economic] effect exists" 1 " despite any lack of
empirical proof.145 Thus, if Raich applies, the Fourth Circuit could have upheld
§ 4248 merely on the basis that sexually dangerous persons might conceivably
have an effect on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court seems unlikely to
reverse the Fourth Circuit on these grounds, however, particularly in light of the
absence of legislative findings indicating that sexual dangerousness affects
interstate commerce. 146

138. See Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 507, 508-09 (2006).

139. Id. at 508.
140. See supra text accompanying note 135.
141. Somin, supra note 138, at 509 (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25).
142. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 280 n.6 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Raich, 545
U.S. at 22).
143. Somin, supra note 138, at 509 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 22).
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 280.
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D. Contrastingthe Eighth Circuit'sReasoning in United States v. Tom
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Comstock, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of § 4248 in United States v.
Tom. 147 The court in Tom upheld the statute, concluding that the statute is a valid
exercise of Congress's power. 148 The Eighth Circuit's reasoning diverges from
Comstock in four significant respects.
1.

Necessary and ProperClause

First, Comstock and Tom see the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause
differently, particularly whether it is acceptable to use one Necessary and Proper
power as the basis for another. In Tom, the Eighth Circuit concluded that where
Congress has the power to criminalize and punish certain conduct, Congress also
has the power to prevent that conduct. 149
[W]e conclude that Congress, having been empowered by the
Commerce Clause to criminalize and punish the conduct of which Tom
is guilty, has the ancillary authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to provide for his civil commitment so that he may be prevented
from its commission in the first place. 150
Like the court in Comstock, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the power to
criminalize and punish is itself an exercise of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 151 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, however, the court in Tom implicitly
assumed that it is acceptable to use one Necessary and Proper power as the basis
for another. In contrast, Comstock rejected this attempt to pile one Necessary and
Proper power onto another and the resulting attenuated connection between the
power exercised and any enumerated constitutional power. 152
2.

Interstate Nexus

The second major divergence between Comstock and Tom regards § 4248's
lack of an interstate nexus requirement. The Eighth Circuit admits "that § 4248
does not contain an explicit interstate travel requirement," but contends that the

147. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009).
148. Id. at 505.
149. It is beyond the scope of this Note to address the shocking civil liberty implications of a
broad Congressional power to prevent crime by confining those deemed likely to commit future
crimes.
150. Tom, 565 F.3d at 505.
151. Id. at 502 ("Congress has the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
criminalize and punish certain activities as a means of effectuating its enumerated powers ....
);
Comstock, 551 F.3d at 281.
152. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 281-82.
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statute is nevertheless constitutionally sound. 153 Underlying this determination is
the Tom court's presupposition that the operation of the statute will surely
prevent federal crimes.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit holds the opposite
presumption that "most crimes of sexual violence violate state and not federal
law . .. [and] Section 4248 thus 155
sweeps far too broadly to be a valid effort to
preventfederal criminal activity."
The Eighth Circuit acknowledges that the statute would prevent state crimes
as well as (ostensibly) federal crimes but argues that Congress is not required "to
legislate with scientific exactitude."' 156 Further, the Eighth Circuit contends that
even if such precision were required, § 4248 "applies to a restricted universe of
individuals . . . who because of the nature of their proclivities are likely to
commit federal crimes." 157 This argument is problematic not because it is invalid
but because it is limitless. Even assuming the argument is correct, it could be
applied (to some extent) to every federal prisoner, and thus sweeps too broadly.
The Eighth Circuit, however, is untroubled by the statute's lack of an interstate
nexus.
3.

Reliance on Legal Authority

The third divergence between the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' decisions is
Tom's selective reliance on legal authority. Although the district court in Tom
relied largely on Lopez and Morrison,159 the Eight Circuit ignored those cases
almost entirely. The absence of these two cases is truly remarkable and almost
inexplicable. Instead, the Eighth Circuit relied primarily on Greenwood, which is
160
easily distinguishable,
and on its own precedent. 161 Although the Eighth
Circuit acknowledged that Greenwood's holding "was confined to 'the narrow
constitutional issue raised by the order of commitment in the circumstances of
th[at] case,"' the court nonetheless concluded that Greenwood is dispositive. 162
The Eighth Circuit also cites various other civil commitment statutes,
arguing that the same reasoning that supports those statutes justifies § 4248.163
This argument is undermined, however, when the court acknowledged that in the
case of those statutes, "the operation of the underlying federal criminal law

153. Tom, 565 F.3d at 505.
154. Id. ("[I]ndividuals committed under [§ 4248] might be prevented from committing state
crimes in addition to federal crimes.")
155. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 282.
156. Tom, 565 F.3d at 505 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 505.
159. See id. at 497.
160. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
161. See Tom, 565 F.3d at 502-05.
162. Id. at 503 (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956)).
163. Id. at 504.
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would be frustrated without the related civil commitment provision." 164 That
reasoning, however, is emphatically not applicable to § 4248. Here, the federal
law was not frustrated. The prisoners in Tom and Comstock were arrested and
imprisoned as a result of the operation of the underlying federal criminal law,
and civil commitment is not necessary to avoid frustrating those laws.
4.

Federalism

The final way Tom differs from Comstock is the Eighth Circuit's treatment
of federalism, finding that "§ 4248 simply does not upset the delicate federal
state balance mandated by the Constitution." 165 The court acknowledges several
differences between § 4248 and § 4246,166 which is similar but more deferential
to states; however, the court was "not persuaded that these differences are
167
significant enough to render § 4248 incompatible with our federalist system."
First, the court notes that there is no inherent impropriety when a federal law
intrudes on an area of traditional state concerns.
Next, the court emphasizes
that § 4248 is merely a "stop gap" measure and, as such, is duly deferential to
state interests. 169 Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit concludes "that § 4248 is a
rational and appropriate means to implement comprehensive
federal legislation
170
under authority granted it by the Constitution."
V.

CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Comstock is an
intriguing and noteworthy case implicating important constitutional issues and
skirting the tension of recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence. While the Fourth
Circuit's reliance on United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison is
probably correct, even under the potential alternative precedent of Gonzales v.
Raich, it seems likely that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in
enacting 18 U.S.C. § 4248. Additionally, federalism concerns support the
outcome in Comstock and counsel for affirmance by the Supreme Court.
Miles Coleman

164. Id.
165. Id. at 508.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2006). This was the statute at issue in Greenwood. See Greenwood,
350 U.S. at 367.
167. Tom, 565 F.3d at 507.
168. Id. (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 292
(1981)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 508.
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